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This paper was presented to the 15th World Congress on Medical Law and was 
substantially reproduced as Lindy Willmott and Ben White, ‘A Model for Decision-
Making at the End-of-Life: Queensland and Beyond’ (2006) 25 Medicine and Law 
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Abstract 
 
A decision to allow a patient's life to end by withdrawing or withholding medical treatment can be 
extremely difficult. In addition to making the appropriate medical and ethical judgments, there are 
also legal considerations to take into account, the most important of which is ensuring that the death 
is lawful. This paper addresses when it is legal to withdraw or withhold medical treatment that is 
needed to keep a patient alive. It draws on cases and legislation from the common law world 
(including Australia, England and New Zealand) and considers the various legal tests applied in the 
different jurisdictions.  
 
Two of the most common tests employed in this situation are the "best interests of the patient” test 
and the “substituted judgment” test. Some jurisdictions also include other criteria as well, such as a 
requirement that withdrawing or withholding of medical treatment is “not inconsistent with good 
medical practice”. This paper analyses these different legal tests, and after identifying the factors 
that are judged to be legally relevant to consider when deciding to withdraw or withhold treatment, 
outlines a preferred model.  This model addresses who the relevant decision maker should be, and 
the criteria that should govern their decision.  It suggests that family members are better equipped 
and more appropriate to act as decision makers than health professionals, and also questions the 
appropriateness of responsible medical opinion as the decisive factor in such cases, preferring 
instead an approach more consistent with the principles of self determination. The model also 
proposes a method for resolving any disputes that arise. 
 
Introduction 
 
More than a decade has elapsed since the difficult issue of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment 
was thrust into the limelight following the death of Tony Bland.   The House of Lords held that it 
was lawful for Bland’s artificial nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn as this was in his best 
interests.1  Prophetically, Ian Freckleton remarked that the Bland decision “will function as a 
seminal case to which reference will long be made about the operation of fundamental principles of 
right to treatment and the propriety of withdrawing or withholding treatment”.2  At the same time, 
he noted the many unanswered questions that remained including the “uncertainty about the role of 
substituted judgment, … the importance of the indignity perpetrated upon a patient whose insensate 
life is prolonged through intrusive means, and the relative importance of the various factors that are 
to be balanced in determining what is in the best interests of a patient who cannot communicate his 
or her wishes”.3   
 
Unfortunately, more than a decade on, many of these questions have not been satisfactorily 
addressed.  On the one hand, the best interests test has been criticised by those who consider the 
Bland decision to represent the first dangerous step on the slippery slope of making “quality of life” 
assessments without any principled means of making such decisions.4  Some suggest that the test is 
flawed for other reasons, for example, that the test “lends itself to interpretation” depending on the 
“correct framing of the question”,5 that the notion of an adult having “best interests” in this kind of 
                                                 
1 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (Bland). 
2 (Freckelton 1993) at 46. 
3 (Freckelton 1993) at 46. 
4 See, for example, (Keown 2000). 
5 (Mason et al 2002) at 518. 
 2
case is a fiction,6 and the increased difficulty in applying the test when the adult is not in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS).7  The enactment of statute in various jurisdictions also suggests 
inadequacies in the common law.8 
 
There are many perspectives that arise when considering end of life decision making – ethical, 
medical, social and spiritual to name only a few.  This paper will focus only on the lawfulness of a 
decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment.  It begins by reviewing the best interests 
test, focusing in particular on its “medicalisation” (due to the significant role played by health 
professionals in making decisions), and the concerns that flow from this.  The substituted judgment 
test is then contrasted and suggested as a preferable model because it gives greater recognition to 
the right to self determination.  Although the substituted judgment test also raises some significant 
challenges, we suggest that a statutory model for substituted decision making could be developed to 
deal specifically with the withdrawing and withholding of life-sustaining measures.  Using a 
recently enacted legislative regime as a starting point, we propose the enactment of a regime that 
sets out the appropriate decision maker in a particular case, and the criteria upon which the decision 
should be based.  Any model should also provide a dispute resolution mechanism, and suggestions 
of this kind are also proposed. 
  
The paper considers the legal position as it exists in a number of common law jurisdictions 
including England, New Zealand and Ireland.  It is likely that the law as set out in these 
jurisdictions also forms the basis of the common law in Australia.  In some jurisdictions including 
Victoria and Queensland (in Australia) and Scotland, the common law has been supplemented (if 
not replaced, at least in practical terms) by legislation.9  By way of contrast with the common law, 
the legislative regime in Queensland will also be examined.10 One final point of explanation is 
necessary: this paper deals with the withdrawing and withholding of treatment only in relation to 
adults.11 
 
                                                 
6 See Bland at 897 where Lord Mustill suggests that a person in the condition of Bland can have “no best interests of 
any kind”. 
7 Concern has been expressed about the possibility of the test being applied in cases of dementia or where an adult has 
suffered a serious stroke: (Mason et al 2002) at 515. Where an adult is not in a PVS, it is unavoidable that quality of life 
assessments will need to be made in applying the best interests test.  See (Mason et al 2002) at 520-523.  While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it is also worth noting the difficulty (at least in some cases) in accurately diagnosing the 
degree of mental incapacity: see, for example, (Kennedy and Grubb 2000) at 2136-2137. 
8 Legislation has been enacted, for example, in the Australian States of Victoria (Medical Treatment Act 1988 and 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986) and Queensland (Powers of Attorney Act 1998 and Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000). See also proposals to enact relevant legislation in England through the Mental Incapacity Bill 
2004. 
9 See note 8 above. In relation to Scotland, see also (Mason et al 2002) at 517-520 as to whether the Scottish Act will 
apply to withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining medical treatment. 
10 The legal position in the United States will only be mentioned in passing and by way of contrast.  The direction taken 
by the various legislatures and in the case law means that the American experience can provide only limited guidance. 
11 There are two major reasons for this.  Firstly, at least in some of the jurisdictions being considered, the legal regimes 
differ between adults and minors.  (In the Australian jurisdictions, for example, Commonwealth legislation (Family Law 
Act 1975) will govern medical decisions of this kind for minors if they come before the Family Court.)  Secondly, even 
in England where the best interests test applies to both adults and minors, some commentators suggest that its 
application may differ, particularly when considering withholding treatment from babies: see (Mason et al 2002) at 504. 
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Best Interests 
 
The test that guides the withdrawing or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment in most 
common law jurisdictions is the “best interests of the patient”. This is the law in England,12 New 
Zealand13 and Ireland.14 Even in those common law jurisdictions where statute has intervened (as is 
the case in a few Australian States), the best interests test remains very influential.15 
 
Although the phrase “best interests” is necessarily vague, it is clear that the primary factor 
considered under this test is responsible medical opinion. Other factors taken into account to 
varying degrees under the best interests test include the views and values of the adult (to the extent 
that they can be ascertained) and the views of the family. Sometimes these other factors have been 
assigned weight as criteria independent from responsible medical opinion,16 although other times 
they have been taken into account as part of making an informed medical decision.17 However they 
are considered, it is clear that life-sustaining medical treatment will not be withdrawn or withheld 
unless it is consistent with medical practice to do so.18 Further, where responsible medical opinion 
suggests that treatment should be stopped or not provided at all, that view will prevail despite the 
likely wishes of the adult and the opinions of his or her family (although these considerations may 
delay such a decision).19 
 
This “medicalisation” of the best interests test, where an adult’s best interests are considered 
primarily in medical terms and other interests that he or she may have are of secondary 
importance,20 is concerning for three reasons.21 The first is that a decision to withdraw or withhold 
medical treatment needed to sustain life is not only, or even primarily, a medical decision. Although 
such a decision is undoubtedly informed by responsible medical opinion, it is also necessarily 
informed by other ethical and personal considerations. The second reason is that a competent adult 
has the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment22 so those without capacity should not have fewer 
                                                 
12 Bland. Note also proposals to enact the best interests test in statute, although that test is probably drafted more widely 
than at common law: Mental Incapacity Bill 2004, cl 4. The law in Scotland was also regulated by the best interests test 
(Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate (1996) SLT 848), although note the change in terminology in Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, s1 to requiring that the “intervention will benefit the adult”: (Mason et al 2002) at 324-
325.  See also (Mason et al 2002) at 517-520 as to whether the Scottish Act will apply to withdrawing or withholding 
life-sustaining medical treatment. 
13 Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 (Auckland Health Board); Re G [1997] 2 
NZLR 201. See also discussions of one or both of these cases in (Skegg 1994), (Gillett et al 1995) and (Peart and Gillett 
1998). 
14 In the Matter of a Ward of Court [1995] 2 ILRM 401. 
15 For example, the best interests of the adult must be considered under the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 
(Qld) and the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), Schedule 2, Health care principle 12(1)(b)(ii). The influence of the 
test under that legislation (although best interests is only one of a number of considerations to which a decision maker 
must have regard) is demonstrated by the approach of the Queensland Guardianship and Administration Tribunal in Re 
MC [2003] QGAAT 13 (see below). 
16 For example, Re G at 210-212. See also Re G (Persistent Vegetative State) [1995] 2 FCR 46 (Fam Div) 46 at 51 in 
relation to the views of the family, although cf the comments of (Kennedy and Grubb 2000) at 2141. 
17 Bland, for example, per Lord Goff at 871; Auckland Health Board at 250-251. 
18 For example, Bland per Lord Goff at 870-871 and Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 883-884; Auckland Health Board at 
250-251. 
19 Re G (Persistent Vegetative State) at 51: “I have no doubt that the law requires … that treatment decisions must be 
based upon the doctor’s assessment of the patient’s best interests.” See also Hunter Area Health Service v Marchlewski 
[2000] NSWCA 294 per Mason P at [91] and [119]. 
20 (Mason et al 2002) at 513-514. See also the comment of (Kennedy and Grubb 2000) at 2141 that in Re G (Persistent 
Vegetative State), once a doctor has formed the view as to a patient’s best interests, the views of relatives are of no legal 
effect. 
21 Although focusing on concerns about the medicalisation of the test, we note that reliance on an adult’s best interests 
raises other concerns, some of which are mentioned in the introduction. 
22 Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449. A clear refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment 
must be respected even if the adult then loses capacity: Re C (adult: refusal of medial treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819; 
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rights simply because of their lack of competence.23 It is accepted that those without this 
competence cannot actually make these decisions themselves but there are approaches, other than 
an adult’s medical best interests, that are more protective of these rights. The third reason is that the 
paternalism24 inherent in a best interests test that is dominated by responsible medical opinion is 
inconsistent with general developments in this area of law. The increased importance in common 
law jurisdictions of the right to self determination, or patient autonomy,25 does not sit well with a 
test being decided primarily on medical grounds by health professionals.26  
 
Substituted Judgment  
 
It is suggested that a more appropriate approach to this sort of decision making is found in the 
substituted judgment test.27 Under this test, “the decision-maker who acts as proxy (who is the 
substitute decision-maker) should seek to make that judgment which the incompetent patient would 
have made, by reference to the patient’s known views and values.”28 Responsible medical opinion 
remains relevant in that a substituted judgment would draw on the views of doctors in the same way 
that a competent adult could consider them, but it is permissible for that decision to be inconsistent 
with medical opinion.  
 
This is the position widely adopted in the United States,29 but the test has generally not found 
favour in the common law world.30 Having said that, there have been some suggestions that there is 
significant overlap between it and the best interests test. For example, Hoffman LJ in the Court of 
Appeal in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland suggested that “what the American courts have called 
'substituted judgment' may be subsumed within the English concept of best interests”.31 Based on 
the above discussion, such a view must be wrong, at least in relation to the best interests test as it 
currently stands.32  
 
The substituted judgment test, although preferred to considering an adult’s best interests, does have 
its difficulties. An obvious one is the quality and nature of evidence that is required before a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Bland per Lord Keith at 857, per Lord Goff at 864 and per Lord Mustill at 891-892; Re T (adult: refusal of medical 
treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 at 653, 662-663, 665-666 and 669; Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321. 
23 Bland per Lord Goff at 865, quoting the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Superintendent of Belchertown 
State School v Saikewicz 373 Mass 728 (1977). For a wider international perspective, see also Declaration on the Rights 
of Disabled Persons, UN GA Res 3447 (9 December 1975). 
24 (Kennedy and Grubb 2000) at 2105 are critical of the paternalism (which they describe as “doctor knows best”) as 
being “endemic in English medical law”. 
25 The classic example is the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment needed to keep them alive on 
grounds most people would regard as unreasonable or irrational: Malette v Shulman and Re B (adult: refusal of medical 
treatment). See also (Mason et al 2002) at 518-519 and (Witting 1996) at 382-383. 
26 A related concern is that decisions as to when treatment is no longer in a patient’s best interests will vary depending 
on the particular views or values of the doctor (or medical team) examining the case: (Kerridge et al 1997) at 239 and 
(Kerridge et al 1994) at 127. 
27 The substituted judgment test is also widely supported in academic circles: see, for example, (Kennedy and Grubb 
2000) at 2144 and (Mason et al 2002) at 519-520; cf (MacFarlane2003) at 139, 141. 
28 (Kennedy and Grubb 2002) at 831. 
29 See, for example, the classic case of Re Quinlan 70 NJ 10 (1976). For a good review of the position in the United 
States see (Cantor 2001). See also (Stewart 1997) at 388-390 and (Mason et al 2002) at 523-526. 
30 For example, Bland per Lord Goff at 871-2 and per Lord Mustill at 894-895. 
31 Bland at 833, see also Butler-Sloss LJ at 822. Thomas J in Auckland Health Board at 242 also noted that the tests 
were “inextricably linked” and this comment was discussed in Re G at 210 without criticism. See also (Mason et al 
2002) at 519; cf (Kennedy and Grubb 2000) at 832. 
32 It may be that if the best interests test took a more holistic approach (rather than just medical best interests), an 
overlap with the substituted judgment test would emerge. This may explain Hoffman LJ’s comments in Bland (at 833) 
as his view of the test was that “the patient's best interests would normally also include having respect paid to what 
seems most likely to have been his own views on the subject”. Some of the cases since Bland also seem to have given 
significant weight to the likely wishes of the adult: Re D (1997) 38 BMLR 1 and Re G (Adult Incompetent: Withdrawal 
of Treatment) (2001) 65 BMLR 6. 
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substituted decision maker can make that substituted decision. Understandably, there are differing 
opinions as to “how sure you have to be”.33 Another obvious difficulty is that it is inapplicable to 
the situation where an adult has never been competent to form views on the issue or develop a value 
system.34 However, this objection is not necessarily fatal as there are alternatives in such situations, 
including a substituted judgment test based on more objective criteria.35  
 
Despite these concerns, the substituted judgment test remains our preferred view. The right to self 
determination is a critical right and it is one already entrenched in relation to the medical decision 
making of competent adults. Although reliance on the right to self determination is more 
complicated when making decisions on behalf of another, when faced with a choice between 
medical decision making and substituted decision making, the latter is to be preferred.36 
 
The Way Forward 
 
Given the entrenchment of the best interests test in the common law world, it is very unlikely that 
the courts would adopt our preferred approach of substituted judgment. Accordingly, we suggest 
that the way forward is the enactment of legislation dealing with who should be able to make 
decisions about the life-sustaining treatment of others, and the criteria upon which such a decision 
should be based.  That Parliament (rather than the judiciary) should determine the way forward has 
been recommended by judges and academics alike.37 The moral, ethical, social and legal issues 
involved are more appropriately considered and delineated by Parliament as the people’s 
democratically elected body. We suggest (and each of these issues will be considered in turn later) 
that the legislation needs to address the following:  
• The degree of incapacity that gives rise to another making a decision on behalf of an adult;  
• The appropriate decision-maker;  
• The criterion or criteria that should govern the decision-making; and  
• How any disputes that arise should be determined.   
 
First, however, we will briefly outline a legislative regime enacted relatively recently that operates 
in one Australian state: Queensland.  This will provide a concrete reference point from which to 
consider our proposed model, and that will include identifying any improvements to the existing 
legislation that might be suggested. The Queensland regime has been selected for a number or 
reasons. Firstly, it is based on legislation recommended by the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission which was drafted after a detailed review of the then existing law and extensive 
consultation with key individuals, groups and statutory bodies.38  Secondly, the regime is 
comprehensive in that it deals with a range of substituted health (and other) decisions, yet it also 
                                                 
33 Different views have been expressed as to the strength of the evidence needed to base a substituted judgment which is 
illustrated by the different positions in the United States, where, for example some State legislatures have required 
“clear and convincing” evidence before such decisions can be made: (Cantor 2001). Other approaches are less 
demanding as the surrogate decision maker is entitled to base his or her decision on more general considerations such as 
values, attitudes to treatment and religious beliefs: Re Quinlan. See also (Stewart 1997) at 389-390. 
34 (Kennedy and Grubb 2000) at 838. Although some courts have nevertheless purported to apply the test in these 
situations with a well known example being Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz. 
35 (Mason et al 2002) at 519. 
36 Cf (Harris 2003). 
37 Bland per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 885 and per Lord Mustill at 887; (MacFarlane 2003) at 143; (Stewart 1997) at 
401. Although note the concerns expressed in (Mason et al 2002) at 522-523 about the difficulties inherent in deciding 
the kind or degree of incapacity that legislation should regulate. 
38 The proposed legislation was contained within the Commission’s final report: Assisted and Substituted Decisions: 
Decision-making by and for people with a decision-making disability, Report 49 (1996).  Other publications produced 
in the course of this reference included the following: Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making by and  for 
people with a decision-making disability, Draft Report WP43 (1995); Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-
making for People Who Need Assistance Because of Mental or Intellectual Disability, Discussion Paper WP38 (1992); 
Steering Your Own Ship?, Issues Paper MP1 (1991). 
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specifically addresses decisions to withdraw and withhold life-sustaining medical treatment.39  
Thirdly, there has been some quasi-judicial consideration of how the legislation operates in 
withdrawing or withholding treatment, which may assist in considering possible improvements.40 
 
In Queensland, the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) (PAA) and the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld) (GAA) set up an integrated regime that permits a decision to be 
made about, amongst other things, health care (including the withdrawing and withholding of life-
sustaining measures)41 where an adult lacks the necessary capacity. The regime does this by 
establishing a list of potential decision making sources, the first of which is available applies: 42 
• Directions given in an advance health directive (AHD) completed by the adult;  
• A decision made by a guardian appointed by the Guardianship and Administration Tribunal 
(the Tribunal) or by order of the Tribunal itself;  
• A decision made by an attorney appointed under an enduring power of attorney; or 
• A decision made by a statutory health attorney (SHA).43  
 
In deciding whether to withdraw or withhold treatment, a decision maker must comply with the 
“general principles” (GP) and the “health care principle” (HCP) which are set out in the 
legislation.44  The eleven general principles are necessarily broad as they apply to all decisions 
made under the Acts, whether they be financial or personal (which includes health care).45  The 
health care principle is also quite general so far as withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining 
medical treatment is concerned as the principle applies to all decisions about an adult’s health 
care.46 In addition to adhering to these principles, the legislation also requires that a decision to 
withdraw or withhold such treatment can only be made when its continuation is “inconsistent with 
good medical practice”.47 
 
                                                 
39 Other legislation has attempted to avoid this issue, for example, Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. See also 
South African Law Reform Commission, Assisted Decision-Making: Adults With Impaired Decision-Making Capacity, 
Discussion Paper 105 (Project 122) 2004. 
40 Re MC; Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1; Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2.  See also Re PVM [2000] QGAAT 1 in which the 
Tribunal considered the capacity of the adult to make a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. 
41 Schedule 2, s5(2) PAA and GAA.  Note that under the definition such care constitutes “health care” only if the 
commencement or continuation of the measure would be inconsistent with good medical practice. 
42 S66 GAA. 
43 A SHA is defined in s63 PAA as the first of the following people who is readily available and culturally appropriate 
to make the decision: a spouse of the adult if the relationship between the adult and the spouse is close and continuing; a 
person who is 18 years or more and who has the care of the adult and is not a paid carer for the adult; a person who is 
18 years or more and who is a close friend or relation of the adult and is not a paid carer for the adult; or the Adult 
Guardian.  The policy behind s63 PAA is to ensure someone will always have authority to make a health care decision 
on behalf of someone who lacks capacity. 
44 S76 PAA; s11 GAA.  These principles are set out in Schedule 1 of both Acts. 
45 A “personal matter” includes health care of the individual: Sch 2, s2 PAA and GAA.  The general principles include: 
presumption of capacity, entitlement of adult to the same human rights as others, valuing the adult as an individual and 
as a member of society, ensuring maximum participation and minimal limitations on the adult’s rights (including 
applying the principle of substituted judgment), and ensuring the appropriateness of the exercise of a power to the 
adult’s characteristics and needs. 
46 The following are relevant considerations within the health care principle: any power is exercised in the way least 
restrictive of the adult’s rights; and power is only exercised if it is necessary and appropriate to maintain or promote the 
adult’s health or wellbeing, or is, in all the circumstances, in the adult’s best interests.  In deciding whether the exercise 
of a power is “appropriate”, the adult’s views must be sought and taken into account (to the extent that that is possible) 
as well as the information given by the adult’s health provider. 
47 S36 PAA (in relation to artificial nutrition and hydration); s66A GAA.  See further note 53. Note also that there are 
further restrictions if the authority to withdraw or withhold treatment is derived from an AHD, namely that the 
condition of the adult must fall within those set out in the section (for example, the adult has a terminal illness and is 
expected to die within one year, is in a persistent vegetative state or is permanently unconscious), and there is no 
reasonable prospect of the adult regaining capacity to decide health matters: s36(2) PAA. 
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The Queensland Tribunal most recently considered a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment 
in Re MC,48 a case involving an 80 year old woman who was suffering from dementia,49 and was 
being fed via a Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy (PEG).  The Tribunal consented to the 
withholding of PEG feeding on an application made by the adult’s sons. In reaching its decision, the 
Tribunal focused on the health care principle that a decision should be least restrictive of the adult’s 
rights50 and in the adult’s best interests.51 The reference to “best interests” in the legislation 
triggered a consideration of the common law cases.52 One interesting aspect of the Tribunal’s 
decision was its view that it did not have to be satisfied that continuing the treatment would be 
“inconsistent with good medical practice”.53 Nevertheless, the Tribunal discussed what responsible 
medical opinion required and concluded that withholding PEG feeding in the circumstances of this 
case would be in accordance with such practice.54 Ultimately, it seems that the decision made and 
the approach taken by the Tribunal reflects the common law approach described above.  This is 
despite the clear enunciation in the legislation of the criteria (which are wider than just “best 
interests”) that must guide a decision regarding a health matter. 
 
We suggest that there may be some helpful lessons to be learnt from the Queensland experience.  
Firstly, while it may be appropriate to draft general (or even specific health care) principles to guide 
the decision making process, the principles should be sufficiently clear as to provide practical 
guidance to a decision maker.55  Difficulties can arise where there are many principles, only some 
of which have application to a decision to withdraw or withhold treatment, while others have 
marginal application and some none at all.  A preferable situation would be to outline those 
principles that specifically guide decision making when dealing with life-sustaining treatment.  A 
second (but associated) comment is that some direction should be given in terms of prioritising 
between these legislative principles.  It is possible for one principle (for example, having regard to 
the adult’s wishes) to suggest a different outcome from another principle (for example, to act in the 
adult’s best interests).56  Thirdly, one could also question the relevance of establishing principles to 
                                                 
48 [2003] QGAAT 13.  
49 The adult was diagnosed with multi-infarct dementia on the basis of cerebral arteriosclerotic disease, was in a state of 
total incapacity and described by the Tribunal as being in a permanent vegetative state. 
50 In assessing whether the exercise of the power was “least restrictive” of the adult’s rights, the Tribunal considered the 
New South Wales Supreme Court decision of Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service [2000] NSWSC 1241, a 
case determined on common law principles.   
51 Schedule 1, HCP12(1) PAA and GAA.  Note that this principle allows a power to be exercised either if it is in the 
adult’s best interests, or if it is necessary and appropriate to maintain or promote the adult’s health or wellbeing.  The 
Tribunal did not consider the alternative nature of these factors and, although it relied primarily on the best interests 
factor, later in the judgment, the Tribunal considered those factors identified as being relevant to “appropriateness” 
rather than best interests.  
52 The Tribunal also considered a number of the Schedule 1 principles to be relevant, particularly GP3 (the right to 
respect for human worth and dignity as an individual) and GP7(4) and HCP12(2) (the need to rely on what would have 
been the adult’s wishes).  
53 At [52]. This view is perhaps open to doubt given the wording of s66A and s66(3) GAA that any consent to 
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining measures can not operate unless the health provider considers 
commencement or continuation be inconsistent with good medical practice. See also the definition of health care in 
Schedule 2 s5(2) (of both PAA and GAA) which extends only to the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures if the 
commencement or continuation would be inconsistent with good medical practice.  In other words, this requirement 
seems to be a threshold before the issue of decision making even arises under the legislation. 
54 At [65]-[66]. 
55 In this regard, see C Stewart in “Medical Treatment or Palliative Care; Class Actions” The Law Report, Radio 
National, 4 March 2003 commenting in the context of the Victorian case of Re BWV [2003] VSC 179 that any 
legislative guidance needs to be clear. 
56 See also (Mason et al 2002) at 520. 
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guide decision making (including the principle of substituted judgment)57 if a health professional’s 
assessment of “good medical practice” can operate as a veto as described above.58 
 
A Model 
 
(a) Threshold of Incapacity – The threshold suggested for when the proposed model of 
substituted decision making should apply is when an adult lacks the necessary competence to make 
that decision for him or herself. 59 Where an adult is in a permanent vegetative state or has at least a 
very substantial degree of mental incapacity, it is clear that he or she lacks the competence to make 
a decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment.60 This threshold aspect of the model 
draws on the Queensland legislation discussed above and as is the case there, it could also be used 
in relation to other health care decisions with the degree of capacity required varying depending on 
the gravity of the decision to be made. 
 
(b) Decision Maker – A decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment will always 
require the input of health professionals.  Their views will be relied upon to understand and 
consider the nature of the adult’s condition and prognosis.  However, this model suggests that the 
role of health professionals should generally not extend beyond that realm.61  A decision to 
withdraw or withhold this sort of medical treatment is a very personal one so if it cannot be made 
by the adult him or herself,62 that responsibility should rest with those who know the adult best: 
family or close friends.63  The regime in the Queensland legislation64 described earlier concerning 
the appropriate decision maker is an appropriate way to select who makes this very personal 
decision. 
 
(c) Criterion - For the reasons already discussed, we think personal autonomy should underpin 
any decision making regime.  Accordingly, the test of “substituted judgment” should (for the most 
part) be the criterion to guide this decision.  If, before losing capacity, the adult had indicated that 
he or she would want life-sustaining measures to be withdrawn or withheld in the circumstances in 
which he or she is currently placed, these wishes should be respected even if they do not accord 
with responsible medical opinion.65  Where the adult had not specifically considered this issue (or at 
least, discussed their views), a decision should be made by the relevant decision maker by assessing 
the adult’s personality and characteristics and attempting to predict the decision that he or she 
would have made in the circumstances.   
 
                                                 
57 Schedule 1, GP7(4) and HCP 12(2)(a) PAA and GAA. 
58 In the cases regarding the withdrawing or withholding of life-sustaining measures that have been decided by the 
Tribunal, for example, the orders made have equated with what was considered to be good medical practice.  This is, of 
course, consistent with the common law experience. 
59 As is the case in Queensland, a Tribunal (the establishment of which is suggested below) would have the ultimate 
responsibility for assessing capacity should that be disputed.  See s82(1)(a) GAA and Re PVM as mentioned in note 40 
above. 
60 This legislative model bypasses the difficulties (associated with the best interests test) of having to precisely assess 
the degree of incapacity that an adult has. The diagnosis of permanent vegetative state has been described as “an art not 
a science” that requires “clinical experience and persistence in observation to avoid mistakes”: (Grubb 1997) 226.  
61 Cf (Gillett et al 1995) at 50. However, under the proposed model, health professionals would have a “gatekeeping” 
role (see further below). 
62 Including through means such as an advance health directive. 
63 A similar approach was suggested by (Stewart 1997). Cf (Chaboyer and Forrester 2000). 
64 S66 GAA.  See note 43 above.   
65 The authors concede, of course, that the supremacy of the adult’s wishes would be subject to some constraints.  For 
example, the adult should not be able to remain on life-support indefinitely in the hope that at some stage a cure for 
their disease may one day be discovered. See (Kerridge 1997) and (Peart and Gillett 1998) at 247-248.  This, however, 
raises issues concerning a person’s right to futile treatment which is outside the scope of this paper.  
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If the adult never had capacity (for example, he or she was born with a disability that impaired 
competence), an objective substituted decision should be made based on what a reasonable person 
in the adult’s position would do.  This would require a balancing of “quality of life” factors 
including the treatment to which the adult would otherwise need to endure, any pain that would be 
suffered, the adult’s prognosis, the extent to which the adult was able to enjoy his or her life and 
(possibly) views of family and friends.66 
 
We predict that, for the most part, this regime would not represent a significant shift in current 
medical practice. Responsible medical opinion dictates that consultation with family should occur 
when making a decision about treatment of this kind and usually all those involved with the adult’s 
care agree on the course of treatment (albeit sometimes over a period of time).  However, 
complications might arise where a family member wishes to make a decision (on a substituted 
judgment basis) that is contrary to responsible medical opinion.  A health professional would be 
rightly concerned if, for example, the decision maker decided to terminate life-sustaining treatment 
where the adult had a very strong chance of a full or substantial recovery.  There would be many 
less dramatic examples of this tension.  We suggest that such situations need to be resolved by 
considering the available evidence.  The further the decision departs from responsible medical 
opinion (as in the example given), the clearer the evidence must be that this is what the adult 
wanted (or would have wanted had he or she turned their mind to the issue).67  If the doctor is not 
satisfied with the evidence or indeed uncomfortable in making a decision about the evidence, the 
matter could be referred to a Tribunal.68  Such a process is not new and can provide a quick, 
inexpensive and objective determination of the matter.  Perhaps the major change needed in medical 
thinking under this model would be the shift in the role played by the health professional from 
decision maker to “gatekeeper” in that he or she assesses which cases should be referred to the 
Tribunal for further consideration.  
 
(d)  Resolution of Disputes – Disputes will arise in any model that is established.  They may 
occur within the family, or between family and health professionals caring for the adult.69  
However, the only relevant issue that needs to be determined under this model is what the adult 
would have wanted to occur in the circumstances.  A specially constituted Tribunal should be 
established to decide this question where there is a dispute.70 The Tribunal should be informal, 
accessible, inexpensive and capable of being constituted at short notice.  External scrutiny from an 
objective body may allay some concerns that health professionals may have about the primary 
decision making role resting with family or close friends.  After hearing evidence about the adult 
involved and his or her condition, the Tribunal should determine what decision the adult would 
have made if he or she were competent.  In other words, the Tribunal’s responsibility should simply 
be one of fact finding – what would the adult have wanted in these circumstances?71 
                                                 
66 As evident from the common law experience, such an assessment becomes increasingly difficult the further the adult 
departs from the condition of permanent vegetative state.  For comment on the concerns about “quality of life” 
assessment, see for example (Mason et al 2002) at 521-522 and (Keown 2000). See also (Peart and Gillett 1998). 
67 See  note 33 above for a further discussion about evidence in this area. 
68 See “Resolution of disputes” below. 
69 No doubt, some health professionals may be uncomfortable withdrawing or withholding treatment when they 
consider that to be contrary to good medical practice.  This can and does occur now under the common law where an 
adult has made an advance health directive, for example to refuse a blood transfusion.  If autonomy is given supremacy, 
health professionals will need to understand and become comfortable with their new role – no longer one of decision 
maker, but to provide information to inform the decision. 
70 The Tribunal established in Queensland under the GAA provides a useful model to consider. It deals with a wide 
range of issues facing adults with impaired capacity including personal matters (which include decisions about an 
adult’s health) and financial matters. 
71 Or, if information about the adult’s views and values are not available or the adult never had capacity, the Tribunal 
should determine what a reasonable person in the adult’s circumstances would have wanted. 
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